Property rights in peasant communities in Peru

Le droit de propriété dans les communautés paysannes au Pérou

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Abstract

Peasant communities in Peru, institutions combining elements from the pre-Hispanic ayllu (Indian commune) and the Spanish commune, were at the beginning of the Republic the object of an official disregard. This situation changed in 1920, when a special treatment including a regime of constitutional protection for their lands was established. Since 1993, during Fujimori’s government, this protectionist treatment of peasant lands has been modified and liberalized, being now allowed the free disposal of communal lands.

These legal changes have mainly influenced communities through the fostering of an individual titling process of lands originally belonging to the community. Even though it is undoubted that this process could weaken a lot of communities and, in fact, mean their disappearance, there is proved that exists a communal property conception which differs with the official right conception regarding property.

In that sense, admitting the historical adaptation ability communities have shown throughout the years, it can be affirmed that the process shall not necessarily mean the communities’ dissolution, but their role redefinition. Nevertheless, this process is open and will involve a redefinition of the traditional concept of communal property and other instruments.

Keywords: Communities / indigenous communities / property / communal property / Peru

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Résumé

Les communautés paysannes du Pérou, institutions qui incorporent des éléments de l’*ayllu* préhistorique et de la *comuna* espagnole, furent au début de la république, objet de l’ignorance officielle. Cette vision changea, depuis 1920, avec l’établissement d’un traitement constitutionnel spécial, qui établi un régime de protection de leurs terres. Avec le gouvernement de Fujimori, depuis 1993, ce traitement protectionniste des terres des communautés paysannes fut modifié et libéralisé, en permettant aujourd’hui aux *comuneros* la libre disposition de leurs terres.

Le nouveau panorama juridique a eu des conséquences dans les communautés surtout en développant un procès origine de nouveaux processus, comme celui d’attribution des titres fonciers individuels des terres originalement communales (collectives). Bien que ce processus puisse affaiblir un grand nombre de communautés, on peut constater qu’il existe une conception de la propriété communale notamment différente de celle que le droit officiel a sur la propriété.

En ce sens, et en reconnaissant la capacité d’adaptation historique qu’ont démontré les communautés paysannes à travers les siècles, on peut dire que le processus d’attribution des titres fonciers individuels ne signifiera nécessairement la dissolution des communautés, sinon la redéfinition de leurs rôles dans le monde rural. Ce processus n’est pas encore achevé et supposera, aussi, une redéfinition du concept traditionnel de propriété communale ainsi que d’autres éléments conceptuels.
INTRODUCTION

After the great attention paid to the Indian issue in Peru at the beginning of the XX century, from the sixties onward the Social Science researches were focused on indigenous communities, known as peasant communities since 1969.

After the land reform that benefited them only partially, and the brief period of president Alan García during which two laws for their protection were passed, the later legislation, especially during Alberto Fujimori’s government, has been directed towards their weakening. The period of political violence experienced between 1980 and around the middle of the nineties severely affected the mountain peasant communities and caused a mass process of migration that weakened them. Legal rules created the last few years have stimulated a process of land fragmentation, which affects the 6000 communities officially recognized at present in Peru and mainly settled on the sierra, the country mountains, and to a lesser extent on the coast.

This work tries to answer the question in relation to the impact of such policy on the communities and above all on the way these organizations process those changes, in particular regarding their land property. Although there are authors who see in this process an unstoppable course towards their disappearance, we think that, as part of the proved adaptation ability of these organizations, they will be able to assimilate it through the redefinition of their functions. However, for these affirmations to go from good will to their materialization in reality, it will also mean the State to decide to support them, changing the stance that has been seen in the last few years.

A BRIEF HISTORY REVIEW

The settlement of Christianized Indians, then called indigenous communities, was developed in Peru, under the Spanish colonial control, for nearly three centuries (between the second half of the XVI century and the beginning of the XIX century). Their main purpose was to facilitate the Spanish the collection of indigenous taxes as well as to guarantee the supply of labor and control the conquered population.

These organizations combined own elements of the ayllus’ Andean rationality and the Iberian communes’ rationality. Indeed “the community, rather than being an institution derived from the pre-Hispanic ayllu, has enough structural elements, product of the order imposed by the Spanish management, for pointing out that the institution has basically a colonial origin. Arguedas’s work on
Spanish and Peruvian communities proposes this affirmation from his specific research, helping so to correct the perception about the history of communities.” (Urrutia 1992: 10)

Despite the rhetoric on Indian and Spanish integration into one social body, the truth is that the division into two republics functioned perfectly during Colony. The division rules were so drastic that every Spaniard, except for priests, was forbidden to spend the night in Indian small towns (Contreras 1989: 18). Even though the system of settlement of Christianized Indians did not work in every case, this kind of social contract, which had as its maximum the Indies Protection Legislation, allowed these communities to function and to resist the siege of colonial haciendas. Within such a situation, the role of indigenous native authorities was fundamental as intermediaries between both societies since “they were the articulating link of the Indian mass, a function that facilitated the means to organize its exploitation”. (Cotler 2005: 75)

Under the influence of liberal ideas, the norms at the beginning of the Republic broke this colonial contract. In 1824 the Liberator Simón Bolívar was the one who, despite he recognized the indigenous communities’ right to land, decreed the fragmentation of their lands, assuming that he would eradicate these organizations, typical of the ancien régime, and thinking that this measure would allow the formation of owners and therefore of citizens. Beyond some legal rules restricting the possibility for Indians, already turned into individual owners, to transfer their lands, the position of disregard toward these organizations’ reality was kept until 1920, when a new Constitution, promoted by president Leguía who proclaimed himself “the Protector of the Indigenous Race”, was approved. One of the aims of these indigenous communities’ incorporation in the Constitution text was to stop the hacienda growth at the expense of community lands, through the legal recognition of indigenous communities and the settlement of a regime to protect their lands. Urrutia states that this attempt was late, because a larger expansion of the haciendas, now in the hands of Creoles, had taken place during the second half of the XIX century.

Between 1920 and 1992 was maintained in the constitutions a regime of communal land protection, which was translated, thanks to the 1933 Constitution, into the prohibition against their transfer, being also considered as not attachable and imprescribable. The 1979 Constitution, which should include the “structural transformations” made during the military government that did the land

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2 The author refers to the José María Arguedas’s work “Las Comunidades de España y del Perú” (Spanish and Peruvian communities). [The translation is mine (TN)]

3 In fact the 1920 Constitution pointed out that “the property of State, public institutions and indigenous communities are imprescribable and shall only be transferred by means of public document in the cases and ways stated by the law”. The 1933 Charter was the one that asserted the three aforementioned characteristics of the communal land protection regime. [The translation is mine (TN)]
reform, reiterated the communal land protection regime characteristics\textsuperscript{4}, but considered as exception of inalienability the approval decision of two thirds of the communal assembly complying with certain requirements, besides land expropriation.

During the military government starting in 1968 was applied in Peru an extremely radical land reform, which managed to eradicate the oligarchy of property owners in Peruvian countryside. Nearly 12-million-hectare agricultural lands were expropriated to be then given to peasants, favoring the adjudication to cooperatives and other ways of association created by the military government. An important change of denomination were introduced into the same Land Reform Law, differentiating since then between peasant communities (located on the country’s coast and sierra) and native communities (situated on the forest and forest summit). In those years, a Special Statute for Peasant Communities and soon afterwards a Law for Native Communities were passed in order to consolidate the changes made.

Years later, in 1987, in the middle of a political speech that enhanced the importance of peasant communities, a General Law for Peasant Communities was passed\textsuperscript{5}. Perceiving the importance of recognition and titling process of communal property, this law was complemented with the passing of the Demarcation and Titling Process Law of Peasant Communities’ Territory.

With the 1993 Constitution approved during Alberto Fujimori’s regime, the protection regime was drastically changed, leaving only in force the imprescriptibility of communal lands. This was consolidated in 1995 through a law (the so-called Land Law) that set additional guidelines by distinguishing between Peruvian coastal peasant communities and Peruvian mountain and forest peasant and native communities. In 1997, showing an open interest on coastal peasant community lands, the Titling Process Law for Coastal Peasant Communities, which mainly searched the individualization of these lands and their transfer to individuals, was issued.

Even though in the last few years we have seen that the Peruvian government has not shown a greater initiative in applying new rules, especially in mountain peasant communities, there has been generated a process in which the communards openly suggest their ambitions to count with a property title for the parcels they possess. Therefore, within the experts on social sciences is discussed if the

\textsuperscript{4} Because of the inalienability, communities are not allowed to transfer their lands in any case, the unattachability impedes communal lands to be the object of embargo, while the imprescriptibility avoids communal lands to be the object of the legal mechanism of adverse possession of property (the usucapio of Roman law), consisting of the acquisition of property by a third party in order to occupy that land during the period of time stated by the law.

\textsuperscript{5} In 1970 the Law 24656 repealed the Special Statute for Peasant Communities.
generalization of the titling for communards would mean the dissolution of peasant communities, given that land is a central element of their identity.

**THE PROPERTY OF COMMUNITIES**

After the brief history review we have just made, we should ask ourselves about the legal norms regarding the right to communal property as well as the mechanisms for its protection, if in force.

Before the abovementioned, we should recognize the importance of peasant communities for the country and the agriculture. These communities control 40% of the country’s agricultural area according to the 1994 National Agricultural Census, although some authors affirm that the percentage is even higher. Peasant communities provide accommodation for a very significant part of rural population. They are considered as keepers of the great biological diversity. Moreover, they played a very important role in the struggle against Shining Path guerrilla movement and were the most affected by the political violence because, as the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) set forth, “One of the sectors most fiercely struck by violence and abandonment was the indigenous people. It is recommendable the State to promote recognition and strengthening of specific rights for indigenous people and communities within the national judicial framework…”

For answering the questions brought up at the beginning of this section, we should start pointing out that the property of peasant and native communities is only one of the many ways of agricultural property under the protection of the Political Constitution. In fact, in the article 88 of the constitutional Charter the State committed itself to guarantee the right of property over land “in a private or communal way or in any other way of association”.

Likewise we should reiterate that the constitutional treatment of communal lands substantially changed in 1993. The article 89 of the Constitution approved that year stipulates:

> “Both peasant and native communities have legal existence and are legal entities. They are autonomous in their organization, in the communal work and in the use and free disposal of their lands, as well as in the economic and administrative areas, within the framework stipulated by the law. The property of their lands is imprescribable, except for the setaside case stipulated in the previous article”.

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6 Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Institutional reforms, p. 10. [The translation is mine (TN)]
Being extended the community autonomy to the “use and free disposal of their lands”, the inalienability was eliminated, so that peasant and native communities can now exercise any act of disposal of their lands: selling, granting, transferring, leasing or mortgaging them, among other possibilities. Within those other possibilities is the one that allowed transferring to communal families the full rights over the community parcels. Being allowed the free disposal of communal lands, the unattachability is also spare, because if the communities could have the lands at their disposal, they can give them as guarantee, so that their embargo should be allowed (and should be added their further auction, if default on debt payment).

Thus, except for the imprescriptibility, communal lands have in practice the same level of protection than the lands of any individual, although we should add other elements we will mention below.

However, during Alberto Fujimori’s government the land reform was ended and the principle “the land belongs to who works it” was dropped. Since then our legislation gives guarantees to the land owner, understanding as such the person who has the property title, without particularly interesting the land use. This meant moving back to the principles in force before the land reform, which not only allowed land concentration but the maintenance of the land useless and even the presence of enfeoffment relations.

By virtue of the changes in the agricultural legislation and in the jurisprudence of national courts made those years, the titling process became a mechanism that guaranteed the best land defense. It explains the creation in 1992 of the Special Project for Land Titling and Rural Cadastre, more known as PETT7 by its Spanish acronym.

Nowadays the most important legal rule dealing with agricultural land is the Law 26505, more known as Land Law, which partly develops the article 89 of the 1993 Constitution.

Such law, as its full name shows, stipulated the general principles considered necessary to promote private investment in the development of economic activities in agricultural lands and of the communities, and distinguished between coastal peasant communities (to which it dedicated the article 10) and mountain and forest peasant and native communities (to which it refers in the article 11). In view of the result it might seem that the members of the Democratic Constituent Congress were not interested to promote, stimulate or protect agricultural lands, but to foster the market of this kind of lands and the private investment in them, in any economic activity. Thus we can affirm that the Land

7 Proyecto Especial de Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural.
Law does not constitute an instrument to promote agricultural activities, but attempts to foster the land market.

The Land Law lays down that the juridical regulation for agricultural lands are done by the Civil Code and that same law. Likewise it asserted the free access of every person, natural or legal entity, to them and established the setaside as one of the few limitations to property right. As mentioned some paragraphs above, the Land Law distinguished between coastal peasant communities and mountain and forest peasant and native communities.

The Land Law tried to provide land owners with greater protection, so that they could only be expropriated due to national security and public necessity, the latter referring only to “the execution of infrastructure works and public services”. As for the setaside, the Land Law denatured the institution when considering that it only would be applied to the lands franchised by the State, in case of breach of the franchise conditions.

On that basis common to all land owners, it is advisable for us to specify the elements characterizing the communal property treatment. This way, communities could freely acquire lands, either by buying them or by other mechanisms. At the same time they could also dispose of their lands, but in that case they have to comply with the article 11 of the Law, such as the approval of two thirds of the General Assembly. A different matter is the case of coastal communities which are allowed to adjudicate the lands to their members with the vote in favor of a part of the communards that occupy parcels in the community.

As has been told above, the communal lands are protected by the imprescriptibility, so that anyone can try to acquire completely communal lands, even though they might have stayed there for a long time. In spite of this constitutional regulation, in the case of coastal peasant communities we should deal with a very unusual way of setaside, established only for them. In fact, this law stipulates that this setaside is right “when third party possessors in a precarious state have used them for agricultural activities under economic, public, peaceful and uninterrupted exploitation for a period not shorter than two years”, so confusing setaside with adverse possession (usucapio) and therefore contravening the constitutional prohibition against adverse possession in communal lands.

The General Law for Peasant Communities stipulates that each community determines the regime of land use, in a communal, family or joint way (article 11). So the General Law would recognize the community autonomy when putting on record that they could combine the collectively-held possession

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8 The setaside, a traditional institution in Latin American Law, is a way of losing the property right, because the property is not being used, according to what is established in the Civil Code.
with the family possession. Showing the current reality due to which almost all communities have
their agricultural lands distributed in family parcels, Bernard Mishkin affirmed in 1946 that
“practically every Peruvian cultivable land is nowadays individually possessed”\(^9\). The constitutional
amendments and provisions of the Land Law we have already review have direct influence on this
matters.

Before those changes in the norms were made, the general principle was indeed that communal
lands were inalienable, so that communal people only had the right to possess or usufruct their parcels,
remaining always the property in hands of the community. Moreover, a communard was legally
forbidden to be a land owner. Nevertheless, inside the peasant communities were held the methods of
appropriation and disposition of lands in a family way, but restricted to their members and under
communal control. The main and more widespread mechanism of land appropriation is carried out
through inheritance. Some contracts with third parties not belonging to the community were
exceptionally done.

The norms described in the 1993 Constitution and the later laws act basing on that reality, when
allowing the communities to have the lands at their disposal. This includes the possibility to transfer to
the communards the full rights over the land. As already said, this situation was not provided in the
previous constitutions or in the laws formally in force up to now.

**A DIFFERENT FORM OF RIGHT?**

The most widespread practice in almost every peasant community through which communal
families possess the parcels and indefinitely kept them as well as transfer their possession in
inheritance to their children, has been generating a peculiar way of understanding the property right in
communities. There has been specifically strengthening the perception that the communards have over
their parcels more than a simple possession, as the previous legislation emphatically affirmed, a
property right. The gradual opening to making contracts for sharing (a kind of sharecropping), land
lease and sale of family parcels, even with people outside the community, ended up happening at the
same time as the issuing of the abovementioned legal norms.

However, the conception of the property right hold by communards has not been much studied
yet. Such conception might only seemingly be the conception of the official law (positive law inspired
by the Roman-Germanic system) but, as we will see, has aspects that are very different from the
western conception.

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\(^9\) Quoted by Urrutia (2003, p. 188).
In fact, while the doctrine governed by the Civil Law affirms that the property right is an exclusive right—as only one person, either an individual or a collectivity, could be the owner, therefore excluding all the others from the property—, the Andean conception of property seems to accept the existence of two title-holders. This could explain why the communards should not have greater difficulties about simultaneously establishing the communal property and the family property in the same lands, thus contradicting the western juridical logic.

Therefore it is fundamental to understand the communal logic regarding communal and family property. The anthropologist Alejandro Diez gives us some elements in order to understand this different property conception, typical of communards, in the following paragraph:

“If could be abstractly clear the distinction between property and usufruct, and concretely both refer us to certain degrees of disposal and uses of the land, with the difference that the former includes the possibility of alienation and transference, in practice both mix up. This is due not only to the closeness of concepts, but above all to the real capacity of many communards to transfer their usufruct rights, under the form of both “sale” and inheritance, within the scopes and limits imposed to them by the collectivity. So, if communards generally accept the community property, recognizing themselves only as “possessors” or “usufructuaries” of the piece of land they work, they consider themselves as “owners” and “proprietors of such lands.” (Diez 2003: 74)

Thus it turns out to be evident that the communards logic is not the same as the Civil Code’s. Neither is the logic shown in the Constitution nor the one in the communal legislation, both the one in force prior to the new Constitution and the subsequent. The last said is confirmed when seeing in the Titling Law for Coastal Peasant Communities that “The juridical regime of the lands adjudicated by Costal Peasant Communities in Assembly or by the PETT shall be the regime of the private property stipulated in the Civil Code” (Fifth Final Provision).

The assumption behind the norm we have just transcribed might shows that for the authors of the Law the individual titling should mean the disappearance of the communal property and also, we could say, of the peasant community. Once more we find here the interpretation that a peasant community is above all a juridical form of property, leaving aside all the other sociological and anthropological elements that made up a community. Paradoxically, it is the same reading of the

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10 A communard could simultaneously affirm that he is the owner of his parcel as well as that the parcel is part of the communal property.

11 [The translation is mine (TN)]
people who, defending the community against external influences, denied and today still denies the possibility that communards could be land owners.

Likewise, the people who more strongly defend the communal property intends to ignore that inside the communities the access to parcels is not egalitarian, because some communards have more parcels than others, not only more quantity but, above all, of better quality. In trying to reject those ideas, Alejandro Diez makes us remember that the collectively-held property of peasant communities “means certain fiction of equality between their members”, although in practice the allocation of communal lands is unequal, also noting down the constituent tension between the individual and the collective.

Equally defending the integrity of communal property, it has been held that there has not been issued the regulation norms in order to make viable the individualization process of family parcels, so that it would not be possible to accept as valid the actions carried out to that effect by the communities. That is not so true, or at least is debatable, because even though the administrative regulation of the Land Law do not refer to the article 11 of the Law, this is clear enough to be applied without needing more regulation norms. This lack of regulation clarity is what led a large number of communities to ask the PETT to approve or even do the division into family parcels, activity to which the PETT was not authorized. Nevertheless, either as ignorance or because PETT’s officers should meet too high goals or simply as an expression of corruption, the fact is that in many peasant communities they have proceed to give individual property titles over lands considered as communal, taking advantage that in some cases the community did not have the titles in order.

While this matter carries on having dark aspects in the legislation and in the administrative and registration practice, the communards’ tension for accessing to the property of parcels increases. There are numerous cases in which communards simply keep their expectations to receive individual titles, without doing anything concretely; however, in other communities their members have already carried out some actions in order to obtain, even illegally, individual property titles. The result frequently pairs family fights and, if the worst comes to the worst, they end before the courts of justice, without meaning to draw a line under the conflicts.

Nevertheless, in the particular logic of Andean communards the usefulness of property title does not result very clear, unlike what the official norms and above all the official propaganda spread. That is why Diez affirms:

12 During Fujimori’s government the authorities, above all the political authorities, reiterated that the property title would allow the peasants to access to bank credits.

Colloque international “Les frontières de la question foncière – At the frontier of land issues”, Montpellier, 2006
“The difference between a title and a certificate is more of ‘degree’ than of ‘genre’. In the communards’ logic the title means guarantee and safety on the access; therefore, the more titles and certificates (reiterated rights) one has, the better. In their understanding of the problem there is no contradiction between the certificate of possession and the communal property title; both are complementary, so that is why it is logic for them to want to have both.”

Within this context one might ask whether the family titling would necessarily mean the end of the community. It is possible that such process will directly affect those communities whose internal organization and communal dynamics have been more eroded by marketing mechanisms and the usurpation of some of their functions by local authorities, private promotion organizations, churches, and so on. However, we should insist that the practice of keeping the parcels under family control is not new; what is new, in any case, would be those family parcels to be protected by an individual property title.

In another respect, it could not be left aside the fact that the Andean rough territory imposed and still imposes cooperation forms that legal norms could not get round. In that sense, still assuming that the greater part of peasant communities may choose to divide the land and issue property titles to the communards (beyond the economic and even practical feasibility to delimit and title a quantity estimated at several million parcels), the reality will be still requiring the maintenance of some cooperation forms that currently replace some functions of the peasant community. The handling of natural resources and others could then suppose the redefinition of the peasant community roles but not necessarily their disappearance.

Although in order to understand a little more the peasant perception on this subject, it is interesting to mention that, owing to a research made some years ago in four departments of the Peruvian sierra (Puno, Cusco, Ayacucho and Huancavelica), an opinion poll of a comunard sample was taken. Among other conclusions that could be drawn from this research we have that the communards associated their lust for property and titling of family parcels with the need to perform a function in the community and to identify themselves with its image. This showed an ambiguity of the communards and, at the same time, a lack of safety regarding their parcels. Therefore it could be affirm that most communards want the individual titling and their community preservation. Likewise this poll showed a high level of communal land fragmentation (in Cusco the average of family parcels was 7), being amazing that, contrary to what the official propaganda offered, some communards had very clear that

13 [The translation is mine (TN)]
14 For further details about this research see Del Castillo, 2004.
due to the smallness of their lands and their little profitability it was very difficult for them to obtain bank credits, but they neither thought of using their land as mortgage security.

One of the conclusions of the poll mentioned in the previous paragraph was the negative perception of the communards about the communal institution, particularly with regard to their children’s future: “Their children were educated in order to them to ‘get out’ of the community, to improve their situation, to be independent, etc, because, according to the communards, ‘there is no future for the children in the community’.”15 (Del Castillo 2004: 116).

In another respect, based on what we have just pointed out, it could not be forgotten the influence represented by the greater contact of communards with the urban world, which has been incremented, among other reasons, due to the strong migration the political violence process implied. As a researcher points out: “Despite its peasant origin, the dynamic core of these networks is being increasingly placed in the urban poles. The reason is simple: in the cities they interact and there are also strong incentives to increase productivity. This means that the ‘community’ objects are and will be increasingly invigorated by their migrating members that have long ago stopped being peasants”.16 (Golte 1992: 22)

Within that complex context, in which has also begun a new attempt of political decentralization in Peru and in which the peasant communities are playing a very small role, should be located the discussion regarding the future of communities. It should be concretely highlighted that there has been opened a period of deregulation of communal lands, without the support of the State in order to the communities to make their own decisions having all the necessary information. On the contrary, during these years the State has remained silent.

Almost paradoxically, this deregulation process is happening in Peru, while the regional and worldwide trend (with the marked exception of Mexico17) is giving greater recognition to the rights of the indigenous towns, a part of which was the approval and ratification of our country to the Agreement N° 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, of the International Labour Organization – ILO.

What has been reviewed in the pages above leads us to suggest the need to redefine the property concept applicable to peasant communities as well as to adapt our theoretic instruments for understanding their reality. If this is not carried out, the public policies and even the approaches of

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15 [The translation is mine (TN)]
16 [The translation is mine (TN)]
17 For the case of Mexico see Pérez, 1998.
peasant associations could generate conflicts, or mean the failure of the attempts to support the development of peasant communities, rather than provide better conditions for the development of these organizations.

Finally and unlike what is happening to other approaches to the communal world, which consider the peasant communities as static entities (either if are being seen as brakes on the development or, otherwise, as cultural decedent’s estate to be preserved intact), we are convinced that the communities keep a lot of their dynamism and adaptation ability. As competently says Marlene Castillo:

“‘Their growth or decrease is an expression of the ‘‘historicity’ of peasant communities, as social actors; their nature is to change, to build their history as part of the macro historical process, in which they come across, interacting with their environment, and defining their strategies against the changes of the political power.’”\(^{18}\) (Castillo 2004: 25)

However, history, as we now know, does not necessarily follow a linear course, so that we should recognize that this process is open, challenging our ability to understand it and to influence on it.

\(^{18}\) [The translation is mine (TN)]
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